Bernard Lamy’s L’Art de Parler Addresses Religious Exigencies by Innocenti, Beth & Milford, Mike
Beth Innocenti Manolescu and Mike Milford
417
Rhetorica, Vol. XXVI, Issue 4, pp. 417–438, ISSN 0734-8584, electronic ISSN 1533-
8541. ©2008 by The International Society for the History of Rhetoric. All rights re-
served. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article
content through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website,
at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: 10.1525/RH.2008.26.4.417.
Bernard Lamy’s L’Art de Parler
Addresses Religious Exigencies
Abstract: Bernard Lamy’s view of rhetoric in L’Art de Parler may
be explained as an attempt to address religious exigencies. Lamy
advises about two religious roles: theologian and preacher. The-
ologians’ attempts to overcome ignorance and preachers’ attempts
to overcome willful blindness and inattentiveness in congregations
help to account for why Lamy views truth as a matter of certainty
rather than probability, and argument as syllogistic rather than con-
nected to style and audience beliefs. Since Lamy conceives of a
traditional sense of rhetoric—copious eloquence—as a source of
religious problems, he advocates a modernized view of rhetoric to
address them.
Keywords: Bernard Lamy, L’Art de Parler, rhetoric and religion,
syllogistic argument, invention
I
n an early edition of his popular and influential L’Art
de Parler Bernard Lamy describes the discourse generated
by traditional topical inventional systems as ill weeds that
choke the corn.1 This attitude ushered in a widespread “revolution” in
We thank Claudia Carlos for correcting errors and infelicities in our English transla-
tions of Lamy’s French. Any that remain are ours. We thank Laura Davis for assistance
with scholarship in Italian.
1Bernard Lamy, La Rhétorique ou l’Art de Parler, ed. Benoı̂t Timmermans (Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1998), 453 n. 2. It ran to at least twenty-nine editions
and was read and cited by thinkers such as Rousseau, Rollin, Blair, Ward, and With-
erspoon; see Benoı̂t Timmermans, “Note sur la présente edition,” in La Rhétorique ou
l’Art de Parler, 5; Pierre Swiggers, “ ‘Art de parler’, usage et système linguistiques chez
Bernard Lamy,” in Gerda Haßler and Jürgen Storost, eds., Kontinuität und Innovation:
Studien zur Geschichte der romanischen Sprachforschung vom 17. bis zum 19. Jahrhun-
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invention as classical inventional systems declined or disappeared.2
Scholars have explained this change as a product of the rise of the
new science; topical inventional systems were replaced by a logic of
induction or scientific inquiry.3 In this study we aim to supplement
this explanation by making a case for what may be described as a
practical explanation—reasons based on the cultural practices about
which rhetorics advise.
To do so, we propose to examine Bernard Lamy’s L’Art de Parler.
Scholars have turned to L’Art de Parler to understand how Lamy
treats issues of enduring interest involving language and discourse4
dert: Festschrift für Werner Bahner zum 70. Geburststag (Münster: Nodus Publikationen,
1997), 97–106 (p. 99 n. 8); H. C. Barnard, The French Tradition in Education: Ramus to
Mme Necker de Saussure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922), 179; Chris-
tine Noille-Clauzade, “Bernard Lamy, ou la Rhétorique de Port-Royal,” Chroniques de
Port Royal no. 50 (2001), 541–55; Douglas Ehninger, “Bernard Lami’s L’Art de Parler: A
Critical Analysis,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 32 (1946): 429–34 (p. 429); Wilbur Samuel
Howell, Eighteenth-Century British Logic and Rhetoric (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1971), 108, 674 n. 624. Scholars have described Lamy’s rhetoric as “without doubt
one of the most popular and influential works of the entire seventeenth century. . . . For
more than a hundred years L’Art de Parler exerted a considerable influence on rhetori-
cal theory in England and America as well as in France” (Ehninger, “Lami,” p. 429; see
also Francois Girbal, Bernard Lamy (1640–1715): Étude Biographique et Bibliographique
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1964), 4; Barbara Warnick, The Sixth Canon: Bel-
letristic Rhetorical Theory and its French Antecedents (Columbia, SC: University of South
Carolina Press, 1993), 21); “de toutes le rhétoriques publiées en français, celle qui a
connu le plus grand nombre d’éditions et le plus grand retentissement” (Michel Le
Guern, “L’Ellipse dans la Rhétorique Francaise de 1675 a 1765,” Histoire, Epistémologie,
Langage 5 (1983): 79–85 (p. 81); see also Volker Kapp, “L’apogée de l’atticisme français
ou l’éloquence qui se moque de la rhétorique,” in Marc Fumaroli, ed., Histoire de la
rhétorique dans l’Europe moderne, 1450–1950 (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1999), 707–86 (p. 777)); and marking the transition from rhetoric to criticism (Neil
Rhodes, “From Rhetoric to Criticism,” in Robert Crawford, ed., The Scottish Invention
of English Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 22–36 (p. 26)).
2Douglas W. Ehninger, “George Campbell and the Revolution in Inventional
Theory,” Southern Speech Journal 15 (1950): 270–76; see also Wilbur Samuel Howell,
Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500–1700 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1956), 381–2.
3Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, p. 376; Eighteenth-Century British Logic and
Rhetoric, cited in n. 1 above, pp. 442–3.
4Anissa Becerra, “Da Babel A Lebab. L’Elogio Della Differenza Linguistica e
Bernard Lamy (1640–1715),” Acme 51 (1998): 115–35; “Fortuna e sfortuna della Rhéto-
rique di Bernard Lamy nella cultura inglese del primo settecento,” in Antonio San-
tucci, ed., Filosofia e cultura nel settecento Britannico. I. Fonti e connessioni continentali John
Toland e il deismo (Bologna: Società editrice il Mulino, 2000), 53–9; “Usage e Raison Nella
Riflessione Filosofico-Linguistica di Bernard Lamy (1640/1715),” Acme 48 (1995): 85–
109; Bernard Louis Crampé, “Linguistique et Rhétorique ‘Cartésiennes’: ‘L’Art de
Parler’ de Bernard Lamy” (diss. New York University, 1984); Geneviève Rodis-Lewis,
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or to identify his intellectual sources.5 But they have not intended
to account for Lamy’s positions on issues in rhetorical theory or
his preferences for intellectual sources based on circumstances he
believed rhetorical practices needed to address. Lamy’s cartesianism
for example is well known;6 still, we may ask: what circumstances
made it appealing to conceive of rhetorical practices in cartesian
terms? L’Art de Parler has been described as a “functional” rhetoric7—
as a view of rhetoric that involves using language to produce effects
in auditors’ minds and the world; but why would it be appealing
to conceive of rhetorical practices in functional terms?
In this essay we argue that religious exigencies help to account
for Lamy’s theory of rhetoric. Although Lamy claims that L’Art de
Parler covers communication in a range of settings—pulpit, bar,
business, conversation,8 and although Lamy published books on a
number of subjects including mathematics, geometry, poetics, and
perspective in painting,9 we focus on religion because this is for
Lamy the most important scene of rhetoric. Lamy was a priest and
teacher in religious schools who wrote didactic religious works for
seminarians.10 L’Art de Parler culminates with a chapter on preaching
in which he asserts that what he has said about the art of speaking
and persuading generally suffices for preaching also.11 Likewise, the
final meeting of Lamy’s Entretiens sur les Sciences covers theology
and preaching. Religious rhetorical practices, then, are a good place
to begin to understand the circumstances L’Art de Parler is designed
to address.
“Un théoricien du langage au XVIIe siècle: Bernard Lamy,” Le Francais Moderne: Re-
vue de Linguistique Francaise 36 (1968): 19–50; Lyndia Roveda, “Bernard Lamy, une
poétique de l’origine du langage,” XVIIe siècle 214 (2002): 137–53; Swiggers, “ ‘Art de
parler’,” cited in n. 1 above.
5Francois Girbal, “La formation augustinienne du P. B. Lamy de l’Oratoire (1660–
1680),” Société des Amis de Port-Royal 8 (1957): 48–85; John T. Harwood, “Introduction,”
The Rhetorics of Thomas Hobbes and Bernard Lamy (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Uni-
versity Press, 1986), 131–64; Kathleen M. Jamieson, “Pascal vs. Descartes: A Clash
over Rhetoric in the Seventeenth Century,” Communication Monographs 43 (1976): 44–
50; Noille-Clauzade, “Bernard Lamy, ou la Rhétorique de Port-Royal,” cited in n. 1
above.
6Harwood, “Introduction,” pp. 133–9; Thomas Carr, Descartes and the Resilience of
Rhetoric: Varieties of Cartesian Rhetorical Theory (Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univer-
sity Press, 1990), 127–8; Barnard, The French Tradition in Education, cited in n. 1 above,
p. 179; Warnick, The Sixth Canon, cited in n. 1 above, p. 25.
8Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, pp. 14–16, 24, 378, 442.
9Girbal, Lamy, cited in n. 1 above, pp. 121–34.
10For a detailed biography, see Girbal, Lamy, cited in n. 1 above.
11Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, pp. 519–20.
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To answer the question of what religious exigencies motivated
the view of rhetoric Lamy advocates in L’Art de Parler, we may be
tempted to begin by overviewing differences between Oratorian and
Jesuit curricula since Lamy was an Oratorian, a teaching order sec-
ond only to the Jesuits,12 served as a teacher and has been described
as “the Oratorian schoolmaster par excellence,”13 and wrote L’Art de
Parler as a textbook for students.14 A problem with beginning broadly
is that it is not possible to generalize about Oratorian or Jesuit edu-
cation; there were regional differences as well as differences based
on who was teaching. In fact, the curricula may have been more
similar than different.15 Instead, we begin by asking how Lamy de-
scribes the exigencies he aims to address in works such as Appa-
ratus biblicus, an introduction to the Bible conceived as a manual
for seminarians that Lamy asserts was designed to make the study
of Scripture easy for “men who are affrightened at the least ap-
pearance of labour;”16 in his Entretiens sur les Sciences, a work that
has been described as “[t]he chief original authority for the work
of the Oratorian schools;”17 and in L’Art de Parler. Thus we also
aim to understand L’Art de Parler in the context of Lamy’s works
more broadly.
There are two main religious roles about which Lamy advises:
theologian and preacher. For Lamy the roles are not unrelated as
people in both must ground their work in the truth of scripture. But
they have different purposes and audiences. Theologians must search
for truth and defend the faith “contre les Infidelles nos ennemis, &
contre nos Fréres rebelles, qui sont les Heretiques. Ils doivent avoir
12John Patrick Donnelly, “The Congregation of the Oratory,” in Richard L. De-
Molen, ed., Religious Orders of the Catholic Reformation (New York: Fordham University
Press, 1994), 189–216 (p. 205).
13Barnard, The French Tradition in Education, cited in n. 1 above, p. 179.
14Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, p. 23; Bernard Lamy, Entretiens sur les sciences dans
lesquels on apprend comment l’on doit étudier les sciences, et s’en servir pour se faire l’esprit
juste, and le coeur droit, eds. François Girbal and Pierre Clair (Paris: Universitaires de
France, 1966), 146.
15Peter France, “La rhétorique chez les Oratoriens au XVIIIe siècle,” in Jean
Ehrard, ed., Le Collége de Riom et l’enseignement oratorien en France au XVIIIe siècle
(Paris: CNRS Editions; Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1993), 239–49 (p. 243).
16Bernard Lamy, Apparatus biblicus: Or; an Introduction to the Holy Scriptures in
Three Books, trans. R. Bundy (London, 1723), ix; Arnold Ages, “Les études bibliques
de Bernard Lamy,” trans. Jean-Robert Armogathe, in J-R Armogathe, ed., Le Grand
Siècle et la Bible (Paris: Éditions Beauchesne, 1989), 182–92 (pp. 184–5).
17H. C. Barnard, “Some Sources for French Educational History to 1789,” British
Journal of Educational Studies 2 (1954): 166–9 (p. 166).
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les armes à la main pendant que le Peuple sous l’autorité de l’Eglise
leur Mere est en seureté, goûtant la douceur de ses fruits, comme un
Enfant mange ceux du jardin du son Pere sans sçavoir par quel titre il
possede ce jardin.”18 The study of theology demands all of one’s life,19
but “une Science mediocre sufisoit à un Predicateur qui n’a que le
Peuple pour disciples.”20 Still, preaching “est le plus illustre emploi
de l’Eglise.”21
In what follows we cover each role in turn, submitting a rhetorical
analysis: the exigencies Lamy identifies and how he proposes to
address them. We explain how these practical concerns manifest
themselves in positions he takes on recurring issues in rhetoric,
namely the nature of truth, and the nature and place of argument
in discovering and communicating it.
The discussion to follow details that the primary theological
exigence Lamy addresses is ignorance, a key source of which is a
focus on disputes rather than facts. Studying disputes leads to re-
ligious indifference which, in turn, leads to disorder in one’s stud-
ies and in the church more generally. Significantly, Lamy does not
blame the weakness of reason for ignorance. He holds that rea-
son is too limited to understand some divine truths and may in-
troduce error. Instead of strengthening reason, ignorance must be
addressed by studying facts. This requires attentiveness, but rea-
son also has a limited role to play as it deduces truths from first
principles. For preachers, the primary exigencies Lamy addresses
are obstacles they face in communicating truth: congregations may
willfully blind themselves to the truth as well as be inattentive. In
neither case does argument help; instead preachers ought to attend
to style. Lamy does not have in mind a grand style because he
holds that such a style can lead congregations to forget what they
hear and attend more to the preacher and his words than to truth.
Instead, preachers must represent truth in many ways in part by
using figures.
18Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 282: against our enemies the infidels and
against our rebellious brothers who are heretics. They must have arms at hand so that the people
under the authority of their Mother Church are secure, tasting the sweetness of its fruits, as a
child eats those of the garden of his father without knowing by what title he possesses this
garden.
19Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 285.
20Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 305: a mediocre knowledge suffices for
a preacher who has only the people for disciplines.
21Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 304: is the most illustrious role of the
Church.
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Theological Exigencies
The canon of invention may intersect with theological practices
in at least two overlapping ways. First, inventional principles may
be used to discover interpretations of sacred scripture. Such rhetorics
may be oriented more toward generating a single, correct interpreta-
tion or more toward generating multiple interpretations. For example
the classical stases for written documents—letter and intent, ambi-
guity, and so on—may be used to discover one or more ways of
interpreting scripture. Second, inventional principles may be used to
advocate or justify doctrinal principles to other theologians. In this
case one issue is how rhetors manage multiple interpretations. At one
end of the spectrum rhetorics may advise the clear presentation of
facts supporting a single interpretation; at the other end they may ad-
vise the development of multiple arguments supporting one or more
interpretations or at least countering competing interpretations. Thus
built into rhetorics advising about theological practices are assump-
tions about the nature of truth—e.g., probable, certain—and what
counts as a true interpretation—e.g., one closest to the literal sense,
one that best withstands counterarguments. Certainly the choices
thinkers make with respect to these issues are linked to philosophi-
cal assumptions which may be grounded in their intellectual sources
or milieu. And it is certainly possible that they may in effect deduce
their positions from a philosophical system. However, if we view
rhetoric as a practical art and theories of rhetoric as advice about
how to practice the arts of rhetoric, then antecedent to philosophical
systems are practical circumstances the art of rhetoric is designed to
address. In other words, practical circumstances condition the selec-
tion of positions on rhetorical and philosophical issues. We do not
mean to draw a hard and fast distinction between the philosophi-
cal and practical but rather want to bring practical dimensions to
the fore in thinking about why rhetorical theorists choose to advo-
cate one position rather than others on recurring issues in rhetorical
theory.
Perhaps the most fundamental problem Lamy identifies in the-
ologians is ignorance. Lamy’s religious works are didactic—designed
to help seminarians and theologians understand scripture with par-
ticular emphasis on the Old Testament. For example the title of Book
III of Apparatus biblicus is “Of the False Gods, Animals, Precious
Stones, Diseases, and Publick Sports mentioned in the Scriptures.
Together with an Explanation of Scriptural Names.” As the title in-
dicates, in this book Lamy lists the gods of pagan religions and an-
imals in scripture, discusses plants, herbs, precious stones, metals,
Bernard Lamy’s L’Art de Parler 423
spices, foods, furniture, hemorrhoids, lycanthropy, theatres, sports,
and more. Lamy asks: “how can a man really call those Divines, who
so little know what the Scripture says, or the Fathers or Councils
have determined, on any topick.”22 Combating ignorance among the
French clergy was a goal of Oratorians more generally as well as Port
Royalists.23
One way of combating ignorance is studying the different po-
sitions on contentious issues, but for Lamy studying disputes is a
cause of ignorance. As he puts it in Apparatus biblicus as well as his
Introduction à la lecture de l’Ecriture sainte (1699): “how many are those
even among those who have for many years applied themselves to
the study of divinity, whose heads are not rather filled with vain
and frivolous school-disputes, than their hearts and minds nour-
ished with the truths of Scripture.”24 Different opinions obscure truth:
“[p]armi la foule de tant de diferentes opinions, on ne voit presque
plus ce qu’il faut croire.”25 In his theological works Lamy does not
want to cloud the discussion with theological disputes. For exam-
ple, Lamy glosses over issues of authorship and interpretation when
he simply remarks: “There is a great diversity of opinions about
the Author of the book of Job, and the time when it was written,”26
and “[s]ome have asserted, that Job, Judith, and Tobit are only al-
legories: and the Jews pretend that there never was such a man
as Job, and that the book which bears his name is nothing but a
parable.”27 One historian has asserted: “C’est justement l’absence de
médiation théologique chez Lamy qui fait de son ouvrage un tel outil
historique.”28
Theologians who focus on disputes not only deprive themselves
and others of scriptural truths but also foster indifference to religious
truth and cause disorder in the church. In Entretiens sur les Sciences
Lamy asserts: “D’autres grands Lecteurs, mais qui n’examinent rien
à fond, qui sçavent le pour & le contre, n’ignorans ainsi rien de ce
qu’on peut dire, tombent dans une indifference pour la Religion.
Tout leur paroit douteux: tantôt ils sont d’un sentiment, tantôt de
22Lamy, Apparatus biblicus, cited in n. 16 above, p. viii.
23Barnard, The French Tradition in Education, cited in n. 1 above, p. 148.
24Lamy, Apparatus biblicus, cited in n. 16 above, p. viii; Ages, “Les études bibliques
de Bernard Lamy,” cited in n. 16 above, p. 187 n. 7.
25Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 281: among the crowd of so many different
opinions, one almost no longer sees what it is necessary to believe.
26Lamy, Apparatus biblicus, cited in n. 16 above, p. 287, see also p. 286.
27Lamy, Apparatus biblicus, cited in n. 16 above, p. 296.
28Ages, “Les études bibliques de Bernard Lamy,” cited in n. 16 above, p. 192.
R H E T O R I C A424
l’autre, parcequ’ils n’en ont jamais examiné aucun comme il faut.”29
Indifference to truth interferes with a young student’s education,
and worse: “C’est l’indifference qu’on a pour la verité qui cause
tout le desordre des Etudes, les erreurs, l’inutilité & le danger des
Sciences.”30 Moreover, ignorance causes disorder in the church.31
For Lamy the way to address ignorance, its source in studying
disputes, and its consequences of indifference and disorder, is not to
strengthen reason. Certainly this is a live possibility; reason could be
conceived as leading to discoveries that address ignorance, and as
a way of addressing indifference by engaging in substantive rather
than frivolous disputes. But for Lamy the theologian’s main strategy
in dealing with controversy is to collect and present facts. For example
to address problems of interpretation caused by the fact that in
scripture “[t]he same man, and the same thing, sometimes has two
names,”32 Lamy provides in Book III of Apparatus biblicus a complete
list of proper names discussed in scripture. His advice to those who
would write on controversial subjects such as usury also focuses on
collecting facts: “pour faire un bon traité de l’usure, il faut faire une
Histoire de tout ce qui s’en est dit exacte & solidement prouvée, où
l’on puisse voir une tradition claire de ce que l’Eglise a voulu que
l’on pensât de l’usure.”33
Lamy’s own work fits the bill. One scholar has described Lamy’s
Introduction à la lecture de l’Ecriture sainte as designed to dispel ig-
norance with learned discussions “sur les antiques pratiques juives,
leurs coutumes et leurs cérémonies;”34 and as distinct from the thou-
sands of monographs on the Bible published between 1685 and 1715
in two regards: its study of the Old Testament in its own right rather
29Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 69: Other great readers, who examine
nothing thoroughly, who know the pro and contra, ignorant of what one can say, become
indifferent to religion. All to them appears doubtful: sometimes they are of one sentiment,
sometimes of another, because they have never examined any one of them as they should.
30Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 73: The indifference one has for the truth
causes all the disorder of the studies: the errors, the uselessness and danger of the sciences.
31Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 43: “On ne peut exprimer le desordre
que causent dans l’Eglise ceux qui ont la temerité d’enseigner ce qu’ils ignorent, & de
décider sur des points où ils ne voient goute” (One cannot express the disorder caused in
the Church by those who have the temerity to teach what they are ignorant of, and to decide
on points where they do not see).
32Lamy, Apparatus biblicus, cited in n. 16 above, p. 362.
33Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 354: to compose a good treatise on usury, it
is necessary to compose a good history of all that is said to be true and solidly proved, where one
can see a clear tradition of what the Church has wanted one to think of usury.
34Ages, “Les études bibliques de Bernard Lamy,” cited in n. 16 above, p. 187.
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than only validating the Old Testament with reference to the New
and in the clarity of its writing.35 In Entretiens sur les Sciences Lamy’s
Theodose recommends that Eugene read Lamy’s treatise on the Jew-
ish Passover which covers “cette seule question, si Jesus-Christ nôtre
Seigneur fit la Pâque legale la veille de sa mort” and notes that to ad-
dress it “[l]es Mathematiques, la Grammaire, la Critique, l’Histoire,
la Theologie y sont necessaires.”36 He also remarks that the author
“est ataqué de toutes parts, & tous les jours il est obligé de répondre
à quelque adversaire nouveau.”37 Thus Lamy, no stranger to contro-
versy, holds that the collection and clear presentation of facts—not
argument—is central to resolving theological controversies.
How do theologians discover facts? Lamy rejects the use of com-
monplaces, asserting that “par la connaissance qu’il a des Pères, des
conciles, des saintes Écritures, il [the theologian] apercevra d’abord
si le dogme qu’on a proposé est hérétique ou catholique.”38 In short,
theologians must consult the Bible and tradition. Lamy describes
the study of theology as a history of what God has revealed to hu-
mans as reported in the Bible,39 the authenticity of which Lamy de-
fends by asking how “errour or corruption [could] creep into” a book
“which has been oftener transcribed, more read, more commented
upon, more quoted, more dispersed” and more often translated than
any other.40 Lamy explains tradition as the handing down of scrip-
tural truth from Jesus to his apostles, and from the apostles to their
successors.41 Significantly, for Lamy the exercise of reason does not
have much of a role in tradition; for example, a council of bishops “ne
cherche pas par la subtilité du raisonnement ce qu’il faut croire: les
Evêques comme témoins y déposent quelle a été la Doctrine qu’ils
ont reçûë de leurs Predecesseurs, & ce que les Fideles ont crû.”42
35Ages, “Les études bibliques de Bernard Lamy,” cited in n. 16 above, p. 186.
36Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 357: this sole question, if Jesus Christ
our Savior made a legal Passover the day before his death . . . mathematics, grammar, criticism,
history, and theology are necessary.
37Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 357: is attacked on all sides, and everyday
he is obliged to respond to some new adversary.
38Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, p. 452, see also p. 443: by the knowledge he has of
the fathers, councils, and scriptures, he will first perceive whether the dogma that has been
proposed is heretical or catholic.
39Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, pp. 279, 353, 354.
40Lamy, Apparatus biblicus, cited in n. 16 above, p. 268.
41Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 278.
42Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 279: does not search by the subtlety of
reasoning what it is necessary to believe: the Bishops as witnesses testify what has been the
Doctrine that they have received from their predecessors and that the faithful have believed.
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Lamy uses the limitations of reason to justify the “first and most es-
sential rule to be followed” in scriptural interpretation: “stick closely
to the sense which the church had given to us, especially in matters
of faith.”43
In fact, Lamy explains the existence of multiple interpretations
of scripture as a consequence of scripture being far beyond under-
standing. As Lamy puts it in Apparatus biblicus: “It is not indeed to be
imagined that a man can arrive at a clear knowledge of these truths;
but the reason of that is not, that they contradict his reason, but that
they are too much exalted above it.”44 This is one of the main strikes
against the use of reason in scriptural interpretation. One cannot rea-
son about the divine by means of “les choses terrestres;” he asks: “De
ce que par exemple les corps sont divisibles, pourroit-on conclure
que la substance de l’ame puisse être divisée?”45 At the same time, as
one cannot know the causes of all things in nature, so in religious
matters reason is limited.46 Lamy holds that the scriptures contain an
“ineffable mystery” that extends further than human logic, so read-
ers must “submit [their] reason to the authority of the Scriptures, in
which God is pleased to instruct [them].”47 To do otherwise leads to
error.
The introduction of error through reasoning is a second main
strike against using reason in scriptural interpretation. Lamy asserts
this as he discusses philosophers who reason upon the mysteries
of the church and introduce “chaque année de nouveaux monstres
d’erreur.”48 Lamy continues: “Quand on reduit la Theologie à des
raisonnemens humains, qu’on la traite comme on feroit une question
de Phisique chacun se donnant la liberté de philosopher à sa maniére,
de faire des sistemes qu’il croit plus vrai-semblables, il s’en fait
une infinité tous diferens, ce qui rompt l’unité de la Foi.”49 A true
theologian must follow scripture and the teachings of tradition alone
or the church will suffer: “[s]ans cela au lieu d’un remede il donne
43Lamy, Apparatus biblicus, cited in n. 16 above, p. 360.
44Lamy, Apparatus biblicus, cited in n. 16 above, p. 15, see also p. 361.
45Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 281: earthly things . . . From the example
that bodies are divisible, can one conclude that the substance of the soul can be divided?
46Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 68.
47Lamy, Apparatus biblicus, cited in n. 16 above, p. 15.
48Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 280: each year new monsters of error.
49Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, pp. 280–81: When one reduces theology
to human reasonings, when one treats it as a question of physics, each allowing himself to
philosophize in his own fashion, to make systems which he believes more probable, he creates an
infinity of differences, which breaks the unity of the faith.
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du poison. . . . Si l’Esprit de Dieu ne suscitoit des personnes, qui
ont soin de fouiller dans les Tresors de l’Antiquité pour en tirer la
verité, les faux Sçavans broüilleroient toute l’Eglise, & les Heretiques
triompheroient.”50
These desires to maintain the truth of tradition and religious
order and unity help to explain Lamy’s narrow, limited conception
of the role of argument in theology and of right reason more generally.
Lamy’s conception of reason is geometric rather than practical. The
study of logic, where Lamy believes education ought to begin,51
teaches how to discover new truths or, as he puts it: “Pour connaı̂tre
une vérité inconnue, ou pour la faire connaı̂tre, il la faut déduire
de ses principes. Comme dans la nature tout se fait par des lois
simples, et en petit nombre, aussi dans les sciences tout se peut
déduire d’un petit nombre de vérités.”52 For Lamy mathematics is also
a foundational subject of a student’s education since it helps students
learn to deduce from first truths.53 In religion, first principles come
from scripture, tradition, the church fathers, and the councils that
preserve the tradition;54 “un théologien raisonne bien et persuade,
lorsqu’il tire des saintes Écritures, des Pères, des conciles, et de la
tradition, des témoignages propres pour faire voir que son sentiment
a toujours été celui de l’Église.”55 First principles are discovered by
using the faculties God has given us and paying “atention à ces
premiéres veritez dont toutes les autres découlent comme de leur
source.”56
Since reasoning only involves deducing other truths from true
first principles, Lamy’s view of reasoning does not leave room for
probability. The aim of logic is not to perfect practical judgment—a
50Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 43: without that, instead of a remedy
it gives poison. . . . If the spirit of God did not arouse those who take care to go through the
treasures of antiquity to take from there the truth, false scholars would muddle the whole
church, and the heretics would triumph.
51Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 65.
52Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, pp. 461–2: To know an unknown truth, or to make
it known, it is necessary to deduce it from its principles. As in nature all is done by laws simple
and small in number, so in the sciences all can be deduced from a small number of truths.
53Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 67; Barnard, The French Tradition in
Education, cited in n. 1 above, p. 167.
54Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, p. 524; Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 285.
55Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, p. 443: a theologian reasons well and persuades when
he draws from scriptures, the fathers, councils, and tradition, evidence appropriate for making
one see that his sentiment has always been the one of the church.
56Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 65: attention to the first truths from which
all others flow as from their source.
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capacity for example to aim for goods such as the just and expe-
dient in situations involving uncertainty—but to order the intellect
and will. The key is to make sure that neither is mistaken, “que
par la premiére [intelligence] il sçache distinguer le vrai d’avec le
faux, & que par sa volonté il suive le veritable bien, qui est Dieu;
qu’il fuı̈e l’erreur & le mal: que ses jugemens soient droits & ses
affections réglees. En un mot, que l’esprit & le coeur soient ce qu’ils
doivent être.”57
Lamy does not offer much advice directed explicitly to theolo-
gians about how to present truth. Lamy asserts that theology needs
eloquence “puisqu’elle ne peut expliquer les vérités spirituelles, qui
sont son objet, qu’en les revêtant de paroles sensibles.”58 Given his
positions on the nature of truth and the role of reason, it may be
predictable that in a brief paragraph of advice on a theological style,
Lamy’s Aminte first recommends clarity.59 But the style must not
be dry: “C’est une espèce d’irréligion que d’envisager les choses de
Dieu sans des mouvements d’amour, de respect et de vénération
qui se montrent au-dehors.”60 He recommends imitating the style of
“le maı̂tre des maı̂tres, Jésus-Christ”61 and the church fathers, but
not the scholastics. Some of the other advice he quickly provides is
the following. If a theologian is worried that readers will not pay
attention to some point, his discourse must be fuller. If he wants to
inspire movements of respect and love for the truths he teaches, his
discourse must be animated. It must be short when the aim is to
reach the principal point and it must be proportionate to the subject
matter.62 Lamy offers more advice about how to present truth when
discussing preaching.
57Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 66, see also p. 81: that by the first he
knows how to distinguish the true from the false, and that by his will he follows the truth
well, which is God; that he escapes error and evil: that his judgments are right and his passions
ruled. In a word, that the mind and heart are as they must be.
58Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, p. 16: since it cannot explain spiritual truths, which
are its object, but by refurbishing them in perceptible words.
59Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 294.
60Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, p. 408: It is a kind of irreligion to face the things
of God without outward expressions of love, respect, and veneration.
61Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, p. 408: the master of masters, Jesus Christ.
62Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 294.
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Preaching Exigencies
Invention need not play any role in preaching if preaching is
conceived as a product of divine inspiration only; the preacher then
is simply a conduit for divine messages. If invention is conceived as a
way of discovering scriptural truths to communicate, then it may par-
take more of theology and less of preaching; preachers would com-
municate truth discovered by an art separate from the art of preach-
ing. If invention is conceived as a way of discovering how to make
a case for an audience, then invention would be more situational—
based more on audience and purpose. These two conceptions are not
mutually exclusive: as we have seen, Lamy understands invention as
a matter of perceiving scriptural truths; but he also recommends that
preachers adapt to particular audiences and situations.63 Again, the
choices theorists make are grounded in philosophical assumptions.
For example in Lamy’s case his position on the nature of truth—all
truths are certain—helps to explain his conception of argument as
syllogistic or deductive. And it is certainly possible to trace this po-
sition to his intellectual sources. Here we supplement this kind of
inquiry with a rhetorical or practical one: what practical exigencies
relevant to preaching does Lamy say need to be addressed, and how
does he propose to address them?
Although the main problem Lamy identifies in theologians is
ignorance, he expresses little concern about ignorance in preachers.
Preachers simply do not need to know as much as theologians be-
cause preachers “n’a que le Peuple pour disciples.”64 Instead preach-
ers must teach and move.65 Two obstacles they face are the congrega-
tion’s willful blindness and inattentiveness. Neither can be overcome
by argumentation; on the contrary, argumentation can exacerbate
both. Therefore Lamy advocates the clear, vivid presentation of truth.
In what follows we amplify these points.
We begin with a detailed statement by Lamy of his conception of
the preacher’s audience, purposes, and means of achieving them:
En un mot, il ne doit rien laisser à deviner, se souvenant qu’il parle
au peuple peu instruit, à qui tout est nouveau, et obscur. Comme son
but est de porter à Dieu ses auditeurs, de les détacher du monde, de
leur faire embrasser la pénitence, haı̈r le péché, aimer la vertu, il doit
ménager tous les avantages qu’il a pour cela; c’est-à-dire, qu’après qu’il
63Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, p. 522.
64Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 305: have only the people for disciples.
65Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 309.
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voit que son auditeur est convaincu d’une vérité, il doit en déduire
toutes les conséquences favorables à la fin qu’il a en vue, faisant de
vives descriptions de la beauté des choses qu’il veut faire aimer, de la
difformité de ce qu’il veut faire haı̈r.66
This description is an amplified version of his conception of the
goal of eloquence more generally: “Le but qu’on doit avoir dans
cette étude, c’est de sçavoir faire connoı̂tre la verité, l’expliquer, la
persuader, & la faire aimer.”67 Lamy puts a premium on moving
the congregation using deductive reasoning and vivid descriptions.
To present truth the key is not to have many arguments but to
express truths in many ways—“les faisant paroı̂tre sous tant de faces
diferentes qu’il est impossible que cette verité ne soit aperçûë.”68 This
position is clear as Lamy praises Cicero not for his argumentation but
for “la belle maniére de metre une verité en son jour, & de la faire
connoı̂tre avec tant de varieté & de fecondité, que les esprits les plus
distraits soient contrains de l’apercevoir.”69
This praise of Cicero also points to one of the key obstacles
faced by preachers: inattentiveness. For Lamy maintaining a con-
gregation’s attention is a significant problem: “il n’y a rien de plus
vrai, que de mille personnes qui écoutent un prédicateur un peu
spirituel, il n’y en a peut-être pas dix qui soient attentifs.”70 He
asserts that “[l]a plus méchante qualité d’un orateur, c’est d’être
ennuyeux.”71 Orators who do not take guard against boring the au-
66Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, p. 525: In a word, he must not leave anything for the
hearers to guess, remembering that he speaks to people with little instruction, to whom all
is new and obscure. As his goal is to direct his auditors to God, to separate them from the
world, to make them embrace penitence, hate sin, love virtue, he must use carefully all the
advantages that he has for that; that is to say, after he sees that his auditor is convinced of
a truth, he must deduce all the consequences favorable to the end he has in view, making lively
descriptions of the beauty of the things that he wants to make them love, of the deformity that he
wants to make them hate.
67Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 32: The goal that one must have in this
study is to know how to make known the truth, to explain it, to persuade others of it, and
to make it loved.
68Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 133: to make them appear under so many
different guises that it is impossible that the truth will not be perceived.
69Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 145: the beautiful style of putting a truth
in its light, and to make it known with so much variety and fertility, that the most distracted
minds are forced to see it.
70Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, p. 463: there is nothing more true than that, out
of a thousand people who listen to a preacher who is somewhat on the spiritual side, maybe
ten are paying attention.
71Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, p. 466: the most wicked quality of an orator is to
be boring.
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dience speak to “rochers.”72 A second key obstacle is the congre-
gation’s willful blindness to truth. Lamy holds that “parce qu’elle
[truth] ne s’accommode pas avec leurs intérêts, ils s’aveuglent volon-
tairement pour ne la pas voir; car ils s’aiment trop pour se laisser
persuader que ce qui leur est désagréable soit vrai.”73 People are
blinded not only by their interests but also by ill temper and
passion.74 A third obstacle speakers may face is ignorance, but
Lamy does not say this is a significant obstacle for preachers:
“tout l’auditoire est convaincu de ce que dit le prédicateur: on
ne le va entendre que pour être touché de quelque sentiment de
dévotion.”75 Therefore it is not necessary that the preacher “en-
tre dans des controverses, comme s’il avait à disputer dans une
conférence contre des hérétiques, ou dans une école contre des ad-
versaires qui impugnent ses sentiments. Il ne doit pas faire une leçon
de théologie.”76
How can preachers overcome these obstacles? Lamy rejects argu-
ment as a means for overcoming inattentiveness or willful blindness.
Arguments do not make people attentive; “le Peuple ne s’apliquant
qu’avec peine aux choses speculatives.”77 Likewise, “[c]’est . . . en
vain qu’on se sert de fortes raisons, quand on parle à des person-
nes qui ne veulent pas les entendre, qui persécutent la vérité et, la
regardant comme leur ennemie, ne veulent pas envisager son éclat,
de crainte de reconnaı̂tre leur injustice.”78 Argument is acceptable if
the audience is simply ignorant. As we have seen, Lamy has a nar-
row conception of argument, describing it in terms of a syllogism:
“[n]ous raisonnons lorsque, d’une ou de deux propositions claires
et évidentes, nous concluons la vérité ou la fausseté d’une troisième
72Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, p. 464: rocks.
73Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, p. 472: because truth is not accommodated to their
interests, they willfully blind themselves to not see it; for they love themselves too much to
let themselves be persuaded that what to them is unpleasant is true.
74Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, p. 439.
75Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, p. 524: the audience is convinced of what the preacher
says: one goes to listen only to be touched by some sentiment of devotion.
76Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, pp. 524–5: enter in controversies, as if he had
to dispute in a lecture against heretics, or in a school against adversaries who impugn his
sentiments. He must not give a theology lesson.
77Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 311: people apply themselves only with
pain to speculative things.
78Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, p. 472, see also p. 439: it is in vain that one uses
strong reasons, when one speaks to people who don’t want to hear them, who persecute the truth
and, regarding it as their enemy, don’t want to envision its splendor, for fear of recognizing
their injustice.
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proposition obscure et contestée.”79 This bare presentation of propo-
sitions is appropriate in cases where orators seek to persuade “ceux
qui nous contestent quelque proposition parce qu’elle leur semble
douteuse et obscure.”80
The near absence of argument in the preacher’s rhetorical reper-
toire may be explained by how Lamy conceives of the relationship
between preacher and congregation as well as the speaker-audience
relationship generally: hierarchical and adversarial. For example, if
a preacher faces a congregation hardened against the truth, “il faut
avoir recours aux menaces.”81 It may also be explained by his opinion
of the weakness of the congregation’s faculty of reason. For example,
preachers ought to attend to delivery because “[p]eu de personnes
font usage de leur raison. On ne se sert ordinairement que des sens.”82
In addition, preachers ought to work “s’acquérir de l’autorité dans
l’esprit des peuples” in part because authority can replace argument:
“[o]n est bien aise de se décharger de la peine d’examiner un raison-
nement, et pour cela de s’en fier à l’examen de ceux que l’on estime,
et de soumettre son jugement aux lumières de ceux en qui on voit
briller une grande sagesse.”83
Instead of argument, Lamy advises preachers to use figures. They
are particularly important for overcoming the congregation’s inat-
tentiveness: “[t]outes les figures de rhétorique ne s’emploient que
pour cela.”84 Even if preachers are to speak on speculative points
they “cherchent des tours & des maniéres d’inspirer de bons mou-
vemens à ceux qui les écoutent.”85 We quote the following passage
79Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, p. 87: we reason when, from one or two clear
and evident propositions, we conclude the truth or falsity of an obscure and contested third
proposition.
80Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, p. 441: those who dispute some proposition with
us because it seems to them doubtful and obscure.
81Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, p. 486: it is necessary to resort to threats.
82Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, p. 515; see also pp. 514 n. 7 and 179: few people
make use of their reason. One ordinarily only uses the senses.
83Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, p. 476: to acquire authority in the minds of the people
. . . one is indeed pleased to be released from the pain of examining an argument, and therefore to
trust the examination of those whom one esteems, and to submit his judgment to the lights
of those in whom one sees shine a great wisdom.
84Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, p. 464, see also p. 221: all the figures of rhetoric
are used only for that. In later editions of L’Art de Parler Lamy describes making the soul
attentive as “lui donner de la curiosité” (p. 464). He reduces this to two principles—
speak of what is grand or appears to be grand, and introduce the subject gradually
rather than all at once (p. 465)—and applies them to preaching (pp. 522–3).
85Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 311: search for tricks and manners of
inspiring good emotions in those who listen to them.
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at length to illustrate Lamy’s analysis of obstacles and how figures
may overcome them.
[P]our triompher de l’opiniâtreté ou de l’ignorance de ceux qui résistent
à la vérité, il suffit d’exposer à leurs yeux sa lumière, et de l’approcher
de si près que sa forte impression les réveille, et les oblige d’être atten-
tifs. Les figures contribuent merveilleusement à lever ces deux premiers
obstacles qui empêchent qu’une vérité ne soit connue; l’obscurité et le
défault d’attention. . . . Comme je n’ai dessein de rapporter, dans la liste
que j’ai donnée des figures, que celles que les rhéteurs y placent ordi-
nairement, je n’y ai pas voulu parler des syllogismes, des enthymèmes,
des dilemmes, et des autres espèces de raisonnement que l’on traite
dans la logique; cependant il est manifeste que ce sont de véritables fig-
ures, puisque ce sont des manières de raisonner extraordinaires, qu’on
n’emploie que dans l’ardeur que l’on a de persuader, ou de dissuader
ceux à qui on parle. . . . Mais la chaleur de la passion ne permet pas que
l’on s’assujettisse entièrement aux règles que la logique présente pour
faire ces raisonnements en forme.86
In this passage Lamy clearly states the obstacles speakers face in
communicating truth—obstinacy, ignorance, and inattentiveness—
and the importance of figures in overcoming the latter two. Sig-
nificantly, Lamy conceives of forms of reasoning—syllogisms, en-
thymemes, dilemmas, and the like—as figures. At first glance then it
may seem as if Lamy conceives of style as argument. Such a concep-
tion would make a host of figures and perhaps other uses of language
count as reasonable appeals, and make Lamy heir to some Renais-
sance rhetorics and an ancestor of the rhetorics of Kenneth Burke
and Chaı̈m Perelman. But for Lamy figures are natural effects of
passion—not reason. They are not regulated by the speaker’s talent
or art but instead by the substance of his brain.87
86Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, pp. 225–6: To triumph over the stubbornness or
ignorance of those who resist the truth, it suffices to expose its light to their eyes, and to
approach so closely that its strong impression awakens them and obliges them to be attentive.
The figures contribute marvelously to remove these two first obstacles which prevent a truth
from being known: obscurity and lack of attention. . . . As I intended to bring in, in the list
of figures that I have given, only those that rhetors ordinarily place there, I have not wanted
to speak of syllogisms, enthymemes, dilemmas, and other kinds of reasoning that one treats
in logic; nevertheless it is manifest that these are true figures, since they are extraordinary
styles of reasoning that one employs only in the ardor of persuading or dissuading those to
whom one speaks. . . . But the heat of passion does not permit one to subject oneself entirely
to the rules that logic presents for making arguments in form.
87Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, pp. 219, 359.
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Lamy’s eschewal of artfulness advances his religious program.
As we have seen, Lamy limits the role of reason in discovering and
presenting theological truths, because some divine truths are beyond
reason and because reason can introduce error. Attentive perception
only is necessary. What is true for theologians is true for preachers:
preachers acquire truth by reading the following: scriptures; “un petit
Commentaire, qui explique netement & sans grande Critique le sens
literal;” the principal works of the church fathers; moral philosophy,
“passant les questions de l’Ecole pour s’apliquer à bien connoı̂tre
l’esprit & le coeur de l’Homme;”88 and a few other select kinds of
works. Even for presenting truth to congregations Lamy rejects the
use of commonplaces: “[i]l n’y a qu’à méditer les premières vérités de
notre religion pour les accommoder à l’intelligence du petit peuple.”89
Topical inventional systems may help young students “faire leurs
déclamations de collège,”90 but preachers’ eloquence is better formed
by consulting examples like Chrysostom and practicing than by
precepts or, as Lamy’s Aminte puts it: “En matiére d’éloquence les
preceptes servent peu: c’est la lecture des Orateurs & l’exercice qui
rend un Predicateur éloquent.”91
Lamy also eschews artfulness with respect to figures because
artfulness would produce highly stylized speech and interfere with
achieving the preacher’s goals. First, highly stylized speech may
prevent truth from staying with the congregation. Preachers who
attempt to reach a level of grandeur not based on knowledge of the
truth move auditors for the moment only; the words of a preacher
whose reputation is based on words only “aussi-tôt qu’elles sont
imprimées elles perdent leur estime.”92 But real grandeur which is
based on knowledge of truth stays with auditors.93
Second, highly stylized speech makes congregations attend more
to the preacher and his reputation than to the truths he is commu-
nicating. Some speakers overuse figures because “leur dessein n’est
88Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 305: a small commentary, which explains
clearly and without great critical analysis the literal sense . . . leaving aside academic questions
to apply oneself well to knowing the mind and heart of humans.
89Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, p. 520: one has only to contemplate the first truths of
our religion to accommodate it to the intelligence of plain folks.
90Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, p. 454: make their high school declamations.
91Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 308; see also Lamy, Art, cited in n.
1 above, p. 465: In the subject of eloquence precepts serve little; it is the reading of the orators
and practice which make a preacher eloquent.
92Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 307: as soon as they are imprinted they lose
their esteem.
93Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, pp. 525–6, 459.
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pas de persuader, mais seulement de paraı̂tre éloquents.”94 As Lamy
says about a speaker with a reputation as an “homme disert”: “Toutes
ces afectations, ces grands mots, ces cadences trop étudiées ne va-
lent rien, parcequ’ils empêchent l’efet de l’Eloquence, qui est de faire
apercevoir les choses dont on parle.”95 When preachers focus not on
scriptural truth but on what may be described as “mere rhetoric,”
their congregations remain ignorant or, as Lamy puts it:
from hence likewise come the declaimers, which fill our pulpits; for I
think no man can give the quality of preachers of the word of God, to
those who quote it seldom. We find them promising in the beginning of
the discourses, to explain the Scriptures; but in the pursuit of them, they
think of nothing but tickling the ears and minds of their auditors, with
far-fetched thoughts and elegant expressions. Thus is [sic] the people
deprived of solid nourishment; thus do christians continue in ignorance
of the knowledge of salvation.96
Lamy’s Aminte echoes this sentiment in Entretiens sur les Sciences
as he opposes a declamatory style in part on religious grounds,
asserting that declamation “est criminelle quand on s’en sert dans
les Chaires de nos Eglises, dont elle fait un Théatre. Ceux qu’elle y
atire ne cherchent que le plaisir passager qu’elle donne, aprés quoi ils
se retirent pleins d’admiration pour l’Orateur & vuides de l’amour
de Dieu, qu’on avoit fait semblant de leur vouloir inspirer.”97 Lamy’s
Aminte praises a preacher who
ne s’aplique pas à divertir ses Auditeurs par une éloquence pompeuse;
par des paroles riches & étudiées, par des mouvemens qui n’ont point
d’autre fin que de produire dans les Auditeurs, de l’Admiration pour
le Predicateur; qu’il joüe la comedie en chaire; ou si cette expression
est trop forte, qui fait comme faisoient autres fois ces Déclamateurs, qui
amassoient une troupe de flateurs, devant qui ils recitoient les Ouvrages
de leur vanité.98
94Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, p. 232: their intention is not to persuade, but only to
appear eloquent.
95Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 134: All these affectations, these grandiose
words, these too studied cadences are worth nothing, because they prevent the effect of
Eloquence, which is to make seen the things of which one speaks.
96Lamy, Apparatus biblicus, cited in n. 16 above, p. viii.
97Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 148: is criminal when one uses it in the
pulpits of our churches, of which she makes a theatre. Those whom she attracts search only
for the passing pleasure that she gives, after which they withdraw full of admiration for the
orator and empty of God’s love, which one had pretended to want to inspire in them.
98Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 309: does not apply himself to entertain his
auditors by pompous eloquence, by rich and studied words, by movements which have no end
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The congregation is not to attend to the preacher himself, “qui doit se
faire oublier, afin que l’on ne pense qu’à Dieu.”99 Auditors must not
“laissent les choses pour considerer les paroles;”100 “[u]ne âme élevée
aime et cherche dans le discours la vérité, et non pas des paroles.”101
Even the Holy Spirit conducting the writing of the apostles directs
them to not use “cette éloquence pompeuse des orateurs profanes,
qui arrête les yeux, et fait que l’on ne considère que les superbes
paroles dont les choses sont revêtues.”102
Jockeying for social position may also motivate Lamy’s advocacy
of “natural” rather than artificial eloquence. Lamy describes the use
of an ornamented style as a mark of lesser lights: a style involving
nothing but “des jeux de mots, & des tours extraordinaires, qui n’ont
point d’autre fin que de surprendre par une fausse aparence . . . est
une marque que leur esprit est petit.”103 Those who are “solides,”
in contrast, “aiment les choses & non les paroles, ils ne regardent
que la verité.”104 Lamy’s Theodose laments about honnêtes hommes:
“Ils n’ont plus de sentimens de Religion.”105 He reports an encounter
with a young man who was reading a book: “Ce livre est tout propre
à faire oublier Dieu, à former un honnête Paı̈en, c’est-à-dire, qui met
sa felicité en soi-même, ou qui ne la cherche que dans les plaisirs
sensibles.”106
Lamy distinguishes argument not only from style and in particu-
lar figures, but also from using premises accepted by the audience. We
but to produce in auditors admiration for the preacher who acts comedy in the pulpit; or if
this expression is too strong, who does as these declaimers did in the past, who would amass
a band of flatterers before whom they would recite the works of their vanity.
99Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 306: who must make himself forgotten,
so that one thinks only of God.
100Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 307: leave the things to consider the
words.
101Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, p. 429: a lofty soul loves and searches in discourse for
truth, and not words.
102Lamy, Art, cited in n. 14 above, p. 433: this pompous eloquence of the secular
orators, which stops the eyes, and causes one to consider only the superb words in which the
things are dressed.
103Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 142: puns and extraordinary turns, which
have no other end but to surprise by a false appearance . . . is a mark of their small wit.
104Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 142: love things and not words, they
regard only the truth.
105Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 129: They no longer have sentiments
of religion.
106Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 131: This book is appropriate to make
one forget God, to form an honest pagan, that is to say, one who places his own happiness
in himself, or who searches only for pleasures of the senses.
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see this in his discussion of how to overcome obstinacy or a congre-
gation’s willful blindness to truths that work against their interests.
What could be called argument Lamy calls “l’adresse.”107 Lamy dis-
cusses two cases where a preacher aims to persuade members of
a congregation to act in ways that are against their self-interest. A
preacher can persuade a woman who cares only for her own beauty
to not wear makeup by showing that makeup ruins her complex-
ion; and can dissuade from debauchery a man who indulges all of
his pleasures by proposing to him milder pleasures or by persuad-
ing him that his indulgences will be followed by great pain.108 Lamy
describes this as cunning rather than argument based on premises ac-
cepted by the audience, because for him arguments involve deducing
propositions from true premises and some of the premises accepted
by the audience—perhaps in these cases that beauty and pleasure are
among the highest goods—are not true. Thus Lamy maintains a hard
and fast distinction between truth and belief or opinion, a distinction
that makes it possible for him to claim that there is a single true inter-
pretation of scripture rather than multiple plausible interpretations.
Conclusions
The religious exigencies that Lamy says theologians and preach-
ers need to address help to explain why developing a cartesian view
of rhetoric—in particular a near absence of art and argument—would
be appealing. If ignorance, inattention, and obstinacy are problems;
if argument at best is irrelevant to resolving them and at worst ex-
acerbates them; and if truth claims are either true or false rather than
more or less probable, then it is not surprising that Lamy holds a
circumscribed view of invention and argument. Certainly vectors of
influence cannot be disentangled; we have suggested that practical
exigencies motivated his selection of intellectual sources, but at the
same time his intellectual sources may have motivated his analysis
of practical exigencies. In any case, the evidence we have presented
supports the claim that Lamy’s positions on rhetorical issues—the
nature of truth; the nature and function of invention, arguments and
figures; the speaker-audience relationship—reflect his take on reli-
gious exigences that rhetorical practices (theology, preaching) are
designed to address and about which L’Art de Parler advises.
107Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, p. 479.
108Lamy, Art, cited in n. 1 above, p. 480.
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Although here we have focused on religion, it is worth noting
an important political implication of this view of rhetoric: no checks
and balances are built into it; it relies heavily on the integrity of the
speaker. As Lamy observes, the eloquent speaker—where “eloquent”
means able to imprint his ideas on the brains of auditors—is of great
use in a republic “pourveu que celui qui le possede soit sage, c’est-à-
dire, qu’il juge sainement des choses, & qu’il ne donne entrée dans
son coeur qu’à des mouvemens justes. Les Orateurs dont l’esprit
& le coeur sont corrompus empoisonnent le peuple & le remplissent
d’opinions fausses & de passions déréglées.”109 These potential harms
could be avoided by a conception and practice of rhetoric that leaves
room for audiences to make judgments, but Lamy’s understanding
of his religious circumstances forecloses this possibility. Eloquence
in the sense of wisdom speaking copiously is for Lamy a cause of
conflict rather than a desirable means of addressing it.
Of course religious exigencies do not entail the view of rhetoric
Lamy espouses. Confronted by circumstances involving conflict and
uncertainty, thinkers may choose among several live alternatives.
Among these is an orientation toward certainty which assumes that
even in civic domains it is possible and desirable to identify a single
truth. Alternatively, it is possible to respond to conflict and uncer-
tainty with an attitude of tolerance and commitment to earned belief,
and to develop rhetorics that engender these. In the case of religious
rhetorics this could involve ways of generating multiple plausible
scriptural interpretations and presenting them with argumentation
and amplification designed to solicit judgment rather than compel
compliance. But Lamy’s rhetoric is not designed to cultivate this kind
of action, and the practical need to counter his version of “rhetoric”
continues.
109Lamy, Entretiens, cited in n. 14 above, p. 134: provided that the one who possesses
it is wise, that is to say, that he judges soundly of things, and that he gives entrance in his
heart only to just movements. The orators in whom the mind and heart are corrupt poison
the people and fill them with false opinions and disordered passions.
